

# HOW TO DEFEAT RUSSIA

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ANNAPOLIS

## PART I.—PREMISES

**I**S Russia invincible?—No! Can Russia be defeated?—Yes! She can be defeated in both the moral and physical fields of war, and if in the former, a third world war is by no means inevitable, and even should it erupt, its length is likely to be vastly curtailed. But these ends are only possible if the Western powers clearly understand that the problem which now faces them is firstly conditioned by the world situation, and secondly, because Russia holds the initiative, by her aims and her strategy. Therefore I will deal with these premises first.

*World Situation.* To-day, but on a vaster scale, the world situation is similar to the one which faced the United States a century ago. In 1858 Abraham Lincoln said: "A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free . . . It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new—North as well as South."

All that is necessary is to substitute "World" for "Government" and "West" and "East" for "North" and "South," and the situation to-day is the same. This is the primary fact upon which the defence problem of the Western powers is based: a world divided into two irreconcilable ideological camps, the one representing Freedom and the other Slavery.

Arising out of this is a condition which was unknown a century ago. It is that to-day all major international conflicts rapidly develop into world wars, and though this is universally

accepted, there are four consequences which are far from being universally recognized. They are: (1) In practice, if not in theory—as the words “world war” imply—all nations, whether they like it or not, are either active or passive belligerents, and in consequence neutrality is outmoded. (2) The age of national wars has passed into the age of group wars. No single nation has the resources sufficient successfully to wage a world war, not even the United States or Russia, only a group of nations can do so. (3) National armies are, therefore, only fully operative when they belong to a group of armies. (4) Logically following this, all major defence problems are now group problems.

*Russia's Aim.* Next, what of Russia's aim? Over thirty years ago it was laid down by Lenin, and apart from it the Western defence problem cannot begin to be understood. In his own words it was “To bring to triumph the World Revolution, to create the Soviet Republic of the World.” In other words, World Revolution was to foster Russian Expansion.

In this vast plan of conquest, what were Lenin's primary objectives? Again in his own words: “To unite the proletariat of industrial Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia with the proletariat of Russia, and thereby create a mighty agrarian and industrial combination from Vladivostok to the Rhine, from the Finnish Gulf to the blue waters of the Danube, capable of feeding itself and confronting the reactionary capitalism of Britain with a revolutionary giant, which with one hand would disturb the senile tranquillity of the East and with the other beat back the pirate capitalism of Anglo-Saxon countries. If there were anything that could compel the English whale to dance, it would be the union of revolutionary Russia with a revolutionary Central Europe.”

Strategically, Central Europe was the centre of gravity of Lenin's plan, which once occupied would unbar the door leading to world conquest.

*World Conquest.* Thus, should this proletarian union be cemented, as Lenin considered it could be by revolutionary means, then it followed that the rest of Europe would become strategically untenable and could similarly be conquered. Once Europe was reduced to a Soviet satrapy, the Mediterranean would become untenable; therefore the Middle East could be won and Africa subverted. Finally, when once the whole of the Old World was Sovietized, the psychological conquest of the New World could be undertaken and the Soviet Republic of the World established.

How long this grandiose plan would take to accomplish was outside the problem; for Russians are Orientals, they do not think in terms of time, instead in those of eternity. A plan to them is a decree of Fate: hence its stability.

Though in 1920 Lenin's scheme was for the time being checked by Pilsudski at the battle of Warsaw, it has now, thanks to Anglo-American policy in the last war, been half fulfilled by Stalin. Nevertheless, the whole of the centre of gravity of the world campaign has not yet been gained, and its winning is the heart of the plan. Therefore Western Germany is now the strategical hub of the world problem. Not only because of its vast industrial potentials, but because of the high intelligence of its inhabitants, who, like yeast, can leaven the Russian dough, and thereby create the Knouto-Germanic Empire dreamt of by Bakunin.

*Russian Strategy.* Lastly, what of Russian strategy? Like all ingredients of Soviet policy, it also derives from Lenin. "The soundest strategy in war," he said, "is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy." Therefore, in his system of warfare, psychological took precedence over military attack and defence. But, be it noted, not over military power because military power is as essential to the former as the latter.

To-day Russia's military power is immense, totalling, so

we have been told, 175 active divisions, one-third mechanized. In all, 2,800,000 men who on mobilization can be doubled. Also 25,000 tanks, 19,000 aircraft and about 350 submarines.

This gigantic mass of fighting man power has two purposes: The first is to cover Russia's psychological war by a terror barrage, a standing threat to all who oppose it. The second is to defend herself should her psychological offensive, as it easily may, lead to actual war.

*Revolutionary Technique.* Does this mean that Russia does not want militarily to conquer Western Europe? I think it does. Not because she could not do so, for as things stand she easily could. Not because she fears the atomic bomb. She has this weapon and is the least profitable bombing target in the world. But because actual war does not fit her revolutionary technique, and were war carried into Western Europe, the probability is that it would be undermined.

The aim of this technique is not to persuade the enemy to change his mind by force of arms—the traditional method—but by internal revolution, by force of ideas. Its means are propaganda, fifth columns, strikes, rebellions and civil wars. It is a technique of conspiratorial subversion, of mental bacteriological war and not of physical attack.

Under Stalin this technique has proved so successful that to-day the Communist world covers one-third of the land surface of the globe and includes forty per cent of its inhabitants. From being the capital of the Soviet Union, Moscow has become the capital of a gigantic ideological empire stretching from the Elbe to the China Seas.

Why, in the event of war, would the conquest of Western Europe undermine this technique? The answer introduces the problem of Russian psychological defence. It is because Russian soldiers would enter a contagious area and risk becoming infected by Western culture. They would be brought to realize that Russia, instead of being the most advanced country in the world, as they have been taught to

believe, is among the most backward, and that, therefore, they were the victims of a gigantic lie.

Can this be substantiated?—Yes. Russia's fear of contagion is common knowledge, and the most notable example of the influence of Western culture on Russian troops happened during the Russian occupation of Paris in 1814 and 1815. Among these men were many young aristocrats and army officers who were so influenced by what they saw that the result was the Decembrist's Revolt of 1825. From it dates the Russian revolutionary movement of the last century, which culminated in Lenin's Third International. Hence the technique of the so-called "cold war" by conspiratorial subversion instead of by military conquest, because it obviates a repetition of the danger inherent in lifting the Iron Curtain, a traditional feature in Russian history.

Paradox though it may seem, the weakness in the Russian technique of terror may be gauged from its intensity, because the more it is relied upon to subdue, the more it discloses the strength of the forces opposing what it is attempting to enforce. For instance, whereas in the twenties of the present century there were from two to three millions of political prisoners in Russia, now there are computed to be from eighteen to twenty millions. And whereas in 1941 there were 8,650 prisons on Soviet territory, now there are 11,760, without counting forced labour and concentration camps.

When we bring ourselves to realize that Russia is living under a greater dread of being infected by Western culture than Western Europe is of being corrupted by Russian Marxism, and that this dread compels Russia to rely on psychological war more so than physical, the defence of Western Europe becomes a more hopeful problem than it would be were Russia's aim, as was Germany's in the last war, to conquer neighbouring countries by force of arms.

*Strategy of Distraction.* Unlike her revolutionary technique, which is world embracing, Russia's military strategy is closely

circumscribed, directed as it is—should the psychological attack fail—towards winning the strategical centre of gravity at the least expense to herself: (1) By distracting her enemy's fighting forces—that is, drawing them away from it. (2) By building up her Satellite forces around it.

Both means have been in active operation since the last war ended. We have been drawn into Malaya, the French into Indo-China, the Dutch into Indonesia, and the Americans into Korea. No less than twenty Western European and American divisions, at present the bulk of the military power at the disposal of the West, are now pinned down in these countries. Also it is daily becoming more and more apparent that Mao Tse-tung, head of the Chinese People's Government, is rather the partner than the stooge of Stalin. That for the time being, at least, in accordance with a two-front strategical plan, they have divided the Old World between them into two spheres of conquest, so as to induce the Western powers to divide their inadequate forces between two theatres of war separated by thousands of miles, and thereby render them incapable of building up adequate resistance on either. "Divide and rule" is clearly the Soviet-Chinese slogan.

Meanwhile, what is happening in Europe, where the centre of gravity of another world war lies? Russia is feverishly rearming her Satellites—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary—and is in the process of raising what is known as the *Volksarmee* in Eastern Germany. The Polish army is to be raised to 600,000 strong; the Czech, so it is reported, will "in twelve months' time . . . be a large and efficient force of tremendous striking power," and the *Volksarmee* is already said to number some 125,000 officers and men, and is to be doubled during 1951. All these armies, like the North Korean, are receiving war-time Russian weapons and equipment, which goes to show that the post-war output of Russian armament must be great indeed.

Should these Satellite armies become reliable, the more the Western forces are distracted, the more critical becomes



the position of Western Germany. Therefore, the longer this process of distraction lasts, the more is the centre of gravity threatened, and the more it is threatened, the nearer becomes the accomplishment of Lenin's plan.

*Stalin's Four Aims.* We can now summarize Russia's present aims as they have crept out of Lenin's central idea. There are four, the first two psychological, and the last two military: (1) Morally to subvert all non-Communist countries—this remains the grand offensive. (2) To protect herself and her Satellites against the contagion of Western culture. (3) To distract Western fighting forces away from the centre of gravity of her plan. (4) To build up around that centre strong Satellite forces, while holding her own in strategic reserve.

In all, it is a strategy built on economy of force, psychological and physical.

## PART II.—SOLUTION

Thus far the premises of the Western defence problem. Next, what of its solution? Because Russia has an ultimate aim, World Conquest, and an immediate aim, the occupation of the centre of gravity, the solution must frustrate both. Further, because the conflict is being fought in the psychological and military fields, the solution must include both.

*The Psychological Solution.* The solution of the psychological half of the problem demands a complete change of mind. First, it must be realized that the so-called "cold war" is the real war, and not merely a nuisance. It is the Third World War, not only in being but in action. It is violently positive and can only be defeated by equally positive action.

The Marshall Plan, valuable though it is in reducing the breeding grounds of the Soviet bacillus, is exclusively defensive, belonging as it does to the policy of containing Com-

munism, which has replaced the initial Western policy of appeasing Russia. The Atlantic Pact is also exclusively defensive, being little more than a diplomatic Maginot Line.

What so far the Western Powers have failed to realize is: (1) That Western economic and political reconstruction are impossible so long as Russia fosters mass Communist movements within the Western nations. (2) That, however many dollars be pumped into Western Europe, European economic recovery is impossible so long as agricultural Eastern Europe is severed from industrial Western. (3) That until Eastern Europe is re-united with Western there can be no assured peace in the world.

The elimination of these defects demands a positive policy based on the psychological offensive, the aim of which is the destruction of Communist power within the Western peoples and without them, including Russia.

This policy demands: (1) That all Russian activities within the Western nations be suppressed; we are at war, and peace time liberties are out of place. (2) That the Communist Manifesto be challenged by a Western Charter, setting forth what Western nations believe in and what they intend to fight for. (3) That once it is published, its principles be lived up to by the Western nations, in order to show the world at large that they have as staunch a faith in their creed as the Communists have in theirs. (4) That a central organ of information and propaganda be created, the object of which is to eradicate the Russian cult wherever it is found, and to keep alive the Western spirit in all countries occupied by Russia. (5) That Resistance Movements within the occupied countries and Russia be stimulated by every means possible. (6) That out of these Movements, secret, potential guerrilla forces be organized, which in the event of war will play havoc with the Russian communications and rear services. Be it remembered that it was the action of the Russian guerrillas, almost as much so as of the Russian army, which brought Hitler's invasion of Russia to ruin.

The psychological offensive is legitimately a preventive war because the more mass resistance within Russia and the occupied countries is fostered, the less possible does it become for the Russians and their Satellites to wage actual war. Such an offensive is practical because of the defects inherent in Communism—its economic inefficiency and the hatred it engenders. Potential Titoism exists in all the occupied countries as well as in the Ukraine; therefore, each one can be turned into a hotbed of counter-revolution.

*The Military Solution.* To meet Russia's strategy of distraction, the Western powers must first of all abandon their policy of containing Communism, which if persisted in cannot but lead to an ever-increasing scattering of their forces and squandering of their resources, and for it substitute a policy of determined opposition. Based on this policy, the first aim in their strategy must be to secure the centre of gravity, and until it is secured, the Middle East cannot be, and compared to the security of either, all other objectives are secondary. The second aim must be, under cover of this security to build up sufficient forces to defend not only the Middle East, but to have in hand a strategic reserve sufficiently powerful that, should it come to war, Eastern Germany and the Balkans can be regained and Europe once again unified.

At present the garrisons of Western Germany consist of seven allied divisions supported by a strategic reserve of five partially equipped ones in France and Belgium. Though these forces are now accepted to be ludicrously inadequate to hold back the Russians who, without counting in their Satellites, can draw upon 175 divisions, thus far it has gone unrecognized that the present foundations of Western defence are radically unsound. Morally so because several of the Atlantic powers, notably France and Italy, are corrupted by Communism, and are therefore unreliable, and logistically

so because the United States and Great Britain, separated as they are from the continent by the sea, cannot rapidly reinforce Western Germany.

Though on December 19th last the North Atlantic Council completed the arrangements initiated in the previous September by the Foreign Ministers in New York for the establishment in Europe of an "integrated force" under centralized control, and recommended the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander—which was forthwith accepted—no decision as to the size of his forces or of the strength of the national contingents composing them was made.

It may, however, be accepted that, to start with, at least 100 *reliable* divisions—40 in Western Germany, 10 in the Middle East and 50 in strategic reserve—in complete readiness for war, will be required if Russia and her Satellites are to be checked. To raise so large a force of reliable divisions, new sources of man power must be tapped, and the sole ones remaining in Western Europe are to be found in Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Western Germany. The last two countries number 78,000,000 people, more than three-quarters the combined populations of France and Britain. Spain could raise from ten to fifteen divisions, and Western Germany from twenty-five to thirty. Both are markedly anti-Communist countries and of the two Western Germany is the more important because her people occupy the hub of the world problem.

*The German Problem.* This blindness to strategic reality was in part overcome at the December Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which unanimously agreed to rearm a limited number of Germans under conditions which would guard against the reconstitution of a German national army and General Staff. Further, the Members of the Council insisted that German participation in the defence of the West would in no way alter the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Organization.

In this half-hearted decision there are two considerable and closely related snags. The first is, if the Germans are to be treated like tribal frontiersmen, will they agree to rearmament? And the second is that, because a purely defensive organization cannot revise the Oder-Neisse frontier, no Western German statesman, without risk of immediate loss of power, is likely to support German rearmament on these terms.

A great people and still potentially a great power, the Germans demand equal rights, and are unlikely to agree to play a purely subordinate role in any defence organization. Dr. Adenauer has on more than one occasion made this clear, and Dr. Schumacher has consistently opposed rearmament. In this he is probably supported by the majority of the German people, who have little faith in an alliance, the members of which for over five years have imposed upon them a Carthaginian Peace—have imprisoned their generals, dismantled their factories, demolished their air-raid shelters, forbidden their children tin soldiers and popguns—and now propose that they should partially rearm because the alliance is impotent to protect them.

If Western Germany is worth holding, then the goodwill of the Western Germans is worth the winning, and it never will be won until a general amnesty psychologically brings the last war to an end, and Western Germany is established as a sovereign power.

The field thus cleared of the ghosts of the past war, unimpeded preparations can be set on foot towards solving the European problem realistically. These preparations demand a policy acceptable to all Germans, and the sole one which will appeal to them is the unification of their country. Further, this is the only policy which can re-establish any semblance of the balance of power and ultimately lead to the re-unification of Europe, without which there can be no peace in the world.

Though this change of policy towards Germany is radical,

would any great power, placed in Germany's position, ask for less? This is a question the Western powers should ask themselves, and particularly France, who hitherto has consistently obstructed German rearmament and continues to do so, not because her people fear another German invasion—this is absurd—but because a strong Western Germany might involve them in a war with Russia. Having ceased to be a martial people, the French fear war even more than German or Russian occupation, and it was this fear of war which was the fundamental cause of their collapse in 1940, and which to-day is the main stumbling-block in Western defence.

What the French refuse to see is what Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick pointed out at Frankfurt on October 11th last: "Power," he said, "had shifted from Europe to two large groups, one in the east and one in the west, and the multiplication of armaments and industrial potential was reaching a point where in the next few years even a nation of 60 million or 80 million people would no longer be able to produce a balanced force, and function as an independent unit. Germany in such a case must join one group or the other."

Here we come face to face with the crucial military danger confronting Western Europe.

Because of the rapid economic revival of Western Germany, she will soon become industrially so powerful that she will be in a position to settle her political and military affairs by and for herself. This means that, unless she is firmly linked to the West by a powerful army, she will have to make up her mind on which group to join. Therefore that, should the door of the Western Group be shut to her, Russia may open the door of the Eastern Group by offering to hand back to Germany as a whole all German territories lost in 1945 in exchange for a German alliance. Never should it be overlooked that there are to-day 9,000,000 Eastern Germans in Western Germany itching to return to their homes, and that in a political crisis they may tip the balance in favour of a Russian offer.

What the Western nations—particularly France—fail to see is, that it is wiser to anticipate German demands by accepting now in principle what later on the Germans will demand in fact. Whether these powers like it or not, 50,000,000 people cannot indefinitely be kept under their thumbs. Further, as the Western Germans are well aware that their country is strategically the most important area in the world, and that it cannot be held without their co-operation, they have enormous political capital to gamble with. In these circumstances, it is far more profitable to be generous than niggardly, and politically a gift is always less costly than an extortion, if only because the latter detracts from prestige.

Should, however, Western Germany be welcomed into the Western Group and her goodwill won, the centre of gravity will be so strongly secured that its security will have a paralysing effect on Russia's Satellites, and it will undermine the whole of Russia's strategy of distraction because it will free Western forces which then can be employed in subsidiary theatres of war without uncovering the centre of gravity.

*The Tactical Problem.* Granted that the German difficulty is overcome, that Spain is added to the Western Alliance and that 100 divisions are raised, could 40 in Western Germany, backed by, say, a strategic reserve of 30, hope to prevent 150 Russian and Satellite divisions over-running the West?

This is a tactical problem, and what are the tactical facts as regards the Russian army? The first is that its strength lies in mass (numbers) and not in mobility. The second is that to prevent congestion of supply, mass compels movement over wide areas. And the third, which logically springs from the second, is that Russian offensives are nearly always launched on extensive fronts. They may be compared with inundations which peter out against resistance and flow through at weak points. They seek the lowest tactical levels, and are, therefore, slow and percolative.

Like all past Oriental armies, the Russian is composed of two categories of troops, a *corps d'élite* and an armed horde. The first is the superior fighting instrument; the horde is secondary to it, and should enemy resistance be negligible, is the occupying instrument which, by flowing over the territories conquered by the first, holds them in submission by terror.

The existing *corps d'élite* is composed of heavy tanks and picked infantry working in close combination. The horde, of infantry, cossacks, etc., depending for supply on every type of horse-drawn vehicle. Though in dry weather the expanses of Russia enable horse transport often to move across country, in the highly cultivated and urbanized areas of Central and Western Europe, many of which are also mountainous, masses of horse-drawn vehicles are road blockers.

As both categories of troops have to be supplied, it follows that the greater the horde the more complex becomes the supply of the *corps d'élite*. Therefore, that the Achilles heel of the latter is to be sought in its supply system. To-day this holds good more so than in the past because petrol-fed vehicles cannot live on the land. Throughout, they have to be supplied from the rear.

Western tactics differ from Russian in that they are based on narrower offensive fronts. The reasons for this are that Western armies cannot draw on the vast fighting man power the Russian can, and that in Central, Western and Southern Europe topography normally prohibits rapid movements on wide fronts. Therefore, Western tactics are not percolative, instead they are based on two tactical acts, Disruption and Exploitation: the penetration of the enemy's front and the disorganization and demoralization of its rear services. Envelopment is an indirect form of exploitation.

Without supply—particularly oil and petrol—the Russian *corps d'élite* becomes inoperative. Therefore the problem of the Western tactician is not how to defeat it by superior strength,



but by superior tactics: (1) How to slow down the *corps d'elite* by an elastic frontal resistance, and (2) how to break through the Russian front at selected points and paralyse the communications in rear of it. Otherwise put, how to cut the *corps d'elite* off from its supply.

The first operation requires tanks which can deal with the heaviest Russian tanks. Also numbers of anti-tank formations. The second requires tanks of the highest mobility and motorized light infantry. Both should be supported by powerful tactical air forces.

Further, should the second operation be carried out at night time—as it can be—as well as during daylight, there is no reason to suppose that 40 reliable divisions, half organized for resistance and half for exploitation, could not defeat any army the Russians are likely to put into the field in the opening phase of another war. It is this phase which is all-important, for if the decisive battle of the war is not won in it, as the conflict lengthens out, more and more will numerical superiority come into play, when attrition will replace exploitation.

History shows again and again that a combination of Resistance and Mobility—of Shield and Sword—is the true answer to Mass.

*Conclusion.* Finally, the question to-day is not “Will Europe survive?” but “Have Europeans the will to survive?” If so, they must think offensively.

During the last five years they have witnessed a phenomenon unprecedented in history: the rise of the Soviet Ideological Empire, which in extent exceeds the Empire of Genghis Khan. Like the great Tartar's this vast heterogeneous Empire is held together by terror, and therefore is fragile in the extreme. All that is needed in its overthrow is the determination to overthrow it. Given the will to survive, all else logically follows; for the intellectual, industrial and moral resources of the West are so vastly superior to those of Russia, that with will behind them victory is certain.